Governance and economic growth by Gradstein, Mark
tv.pS 3b6
POLICY  RESEARCH  WORKING  PAPER  3 098
Governance  and Economic Growth
Mark Gradstein
The World Bank


















































































































dI  2678POLIcY  RESEARCH  WORKING  PAPER  3098
Abstract
Because  protection of property rights cannot be  framework.  Drawing on North (1990), he presents a
appropriated  by any individual,  it is widely  recognized  as  model where economic  performance  and enforcement  of
being the state's responsibility.  Moreover,  recent  property rights may reinforce each other. Initial
empirical evidence  .gests  that protection of property  conditions determine the economy's convergence  to a
rights leads to higher investment  levels and faster  high-income  or a  low-income steady state. Existing
growth.  The extent of r.-onerty  -ghts  protection differs  empirical evidence  offers tentative support for this
significantly across  countries. Gradstein  integrates the  theory.
emergence  of property rights within a simple growth
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Maintaining  law and order, in particular,  securing property rights, is probably
the most acceptable rationale for government  intervention. Theoretically, it is argued
that enforcement of property rights being a public good, its provision can only be
materialized through collective action. Empirically, several studies, discussed more in
detail below, have reported robust correlations  between the enforceability of property
rights and measures of economic performance.
Yet, economies differ greatly in the extent to which property rights are
enforced. Several pieces of empirical evidence suggest, in particular, a strong positive
association between the level of a country's development and the enforcement of
property rights.  Bardhan (1997) for example, cites the experience of Singapore, where
recent economic growth has induced a drastic reduction in corruption,  so that Singapore
is now one of the world's least corrupt countries.  It is also interesting to compare the
recent experience of some transition economies in East Europe in this regard. While
countries like Estonia and Hungary have attained moderate scores on the quality of
government and robust growth rates in the post-communist era, the relatively more
backwards countries  such as Moldova and the Ukraine have achieved little on both
counts. Moreover, in their authoritative  account, two experts on the transition
experience in Russia write:
"In  developed  market  economies,  a  conventional  system  of property
rights  enforcement  and  contract  implementation  is  provided  by  the
government and the judiciary and paid for by taxes. However, if this can
be  considered  to  represent  the  first-best  solution,  the  immediate
implementation  of  such  a  solution  in  Russian  case  is  hopeless...
Widespread  tax  evasion  has  left  the  government  without  enough
revenues  to  pay  even  those  meager  salaries  it  offers  to  its  law-
enforcement  officers  (including  the  police  force,  prosecutors,  and
judges)."  (Braguinsky and Yavlinsky 2000)
Taken together, these examples suggest a double feedback relationship between
economic development  and enforcement of property rights, in particular, indicating that
affluent economies are likely to more affectively enforce property rights than pooreconomies.1 This paper is an attempt to capture this relationship  in a simple growth
model, augmented with political economy features. It is assumed that a part of
productive investment in the economy is subject to rent-seeking redistributive activity.
The fraction of resources available for such redistribution is endogenously determined
through collective decisions on the extent of property rights enforcement. Specifically,
property rights can be fully secured by incurring a cost. In line with the public good
nature of property rights, we assume indivisibility in the production of their
enforcement.  This ensures that enforcement of property rights will only take place in
rich economies, where the individuals are affluent enough to be willing to meet the
enforcement cost. But a better enforcement of  property rights causes economic growth,
thus perpetuating the willingness to secure property rights. As a result, it is shown that
two steady states are likely to be realized: one, with a full protection of property rights
and a high income level, and another, with only a minimal protection of  property rights
and a low income level. One implication of this analysis emphasizes the importance of
commitment mechanisms to ensure enforcement of property rights; the absence of such
commitment may induce lower investment and higher rent seeking thus lowering
growth. Another implication indicates a role of international lending institutions in
providing resources to implement governance reforms so as to allow a poor economy to
take off.
The paper is organized as follows. The next section presents the basic setup,
which is followed by the presentation of the results in section 3.  Section 4 discusses
empirical findings, policy implications,  and relation to the literature,  and section 5
concludes with brief remarks.
2.  Basic Framework
The economy is populated by a continuum of households indexed by i and
represented by the unit interval,  each consisting of a parent and child; it operates in
discrete time t. The initial level of household income is yo, and y  denotes the income
'As  North (1990) puts it, "economic history is overwhelmingly  a story of economies  that failed to
produce a set of economic  rules of the game (with enforcement)  that induce sustained economic
growth."
2level in period t. Initially, the amount of law and order as reflected by the protected
fraction of individual income is Lo, 0 < Lo < 1, and L, denotes the protected fraction of
income in period t.
The level Lo is interpreted as a minimal protection of property being guaranteed
by the prevailing social norms or "natural law" and, therefore, not requiring any explicit
costs of enforcement.2 The role of informal, cultural factors in maintaining property
rights has been recently empirically documented,  see, for example, Knack and Keefer
(1997b). More specifically,  Mauro (1995), and Easterly and Levine (1997), in their
cross-country analyses find that measures of ethnolinguistic fractionalization are
directly related to corruption and rent seeking; Alesina and others (1999), detect their
negative impact on policies within U.S. communities.  Glaeser and others (2000), find
relationship between ethnicity and trust, which affects the efficiency of economic
transactions in an experimental  setting. These factors can provide an empirical
underpinning for the initial minimal level of  property rights enforcement.  To obtain
interesting results, Lo is assumed to be small.
In contrast, to secure a full protection of property rights, L, = 1, requires a costly
investment, T,  which is funded through taxes.3 Because all individuals within a cohort
possess identical incomes, their burden in financing the cost of enforcement is also
identical, so that Tcan also be interpreted as an individual cost in protecting property
rights. The interesting case will be the one where Tis not very small.
In each period, the individuals divide their income between paying taxes to
meet the cost of law and order, current consumption cit and investment hit so as to
satisfy the budget constraint:
yit= cit + kit + T6t
2 See Konrad and Skaperdas (1998), for a simple model of how social norms shape initial property
rights.
3 Apart from direct costs of designing the legal systemn,  this consists of the cost of collecting
information,  monitoring behaviour,  and building reputation  for law enforcement.
3where  , is an indicator function, assuming the values of 1 if  property rights are fully
protected and 0 if no investment is made to guarantee property rights protection.
Each household is endowed with one unit of time, which is allocated between
productive activity, wit and unproductive activity, uit according to the constraint:
1= Wjj  + ui,  (2)
Next-period gross income of household i, zt+j is then produced using both
capital and labor as inputs, according to the following technology:
zit+l = A kita wit  (3)
where A > 0 is a exogenously given parameter of technology to which all individuals
have access, and 0 < a < 1, which implies diminishing returns to scale.
While a fraction L, of income is fully protected, the remaining  1- L, is available
for redistribution through unproductive or rent-seeking activity.  Letting Z,+, =  f  ziI+
di denote the aggregate  income, (1- L,)Z,+, is, therefore, the amount of income available
for rent seeking. It is assumed that a spending of ui, on rent seeking secures individual i
the fraction of r(ujt)/  f  r( uit)di of aggregate income, where r is increasing, concave,
with r(O) = 0, r(l) = 1, and r(O)/  f  r( 0) di = 0. This specification is very common in
the rent-seeking literature-see Nitzan's survey (1994). The important difference is that
in the present formulation, because every agent is atomistically small, the individuals
presume that their rent-seeking efforts do not have aggregate consequences; see,
however, an extension below which modifies this assumption.
The net next-period income, yit+1, is the sum total of work-generated income
and income that accrues through rent seeking,
Yit+1 = LI zi, + (1- LI) Z,+, r(u 1:)/  f  d( Ui)  di  (4)
4The income is bequeathed to one's child. Each parent's preferences derive from
consumption as well as from the amount of income transferred to the child. Assuming
logarithmic preferences,  we write:
ci(t, yit+I) = (1-fllog(c,t) + /llog(yi,+A),  0 < p < 1  (5)
In each period, the adult individuals first detennine the extent of property rights
protection by collectively setting Lt. Then each parent makes his consumption-
investment decision; thereafter, the work-appropriation  decisions follow. The
equilibrium consists of such mutually consistent decisions.
3.  Equilibrium
The above assumptions guarantee that, despite the dynamic setting, the
decisionmaking problem is essentially a static one and consists of equilibrium
allocations made by the parents. The analysis proceeds backwards starting with the
determination of time allocation between work and rent seeking given the investment
decisions; its details are presented in the appendix available from the author.
Note that, given that the productivity parameter A is large enough, under each
regime the economy converges to a steady state level of income denoted yo  when Lt =
Lo, andy'  when L, = L,.4 Provided that Lo is sufficiently small as we have assumed is
the case, y2  >y°, Figure 1 illustrates this by presenting the intertemporal income
evolution in both cases. Moreover, when current income level is small enough, next-
period income is lower under full protection of  property rights than under minimal
protection. The reason for this is that the economic performance under full protection of
property rights is adversely affected in the short run by the tax burden, but recovers
afterwards.
These properties are summarized in Proposition 1 below and illustrated in
Figure 1.
4Specifical1y,)y=(A(1-u))l't-)[a8fLoy 0 l(a/6Lo+  I -A]r-a)andyl=A  (a8y'  - 7)! (af8+  1
fl)]a
5:  Yt+I  Figure  1: Intertemporal  income evolution
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Proposition 1. Current consumption is higher, but steady state income level is
lower under minimal protection of property rights than under full protection. Next-
period income is higher under the former if present income is low, but is higher under
the latter when present income is high.
The above results have direct implications for welfare comparisons between the
two regimes. When present income is low, both consumption and next-period income
are higher without full protection of property rights, so that this regime attains a higher
level of welfare. In contrast, when present income is high enough, the resulting increase
in next-period income under full enforcement of property rights more than compensates
the lower level of consumption, thus causing welfare to be higher. The intuition here is
straightforward:  while the tax burden associated with full  enforcement is significant in a
poor economy it ceases being so, as taxes contribute a smaller share of income.
To sum up,
6Proposition 2. When the economy is poor enough, the regime of minimal
protection of property rights leads to a higher welfare level; however, in a rich
economy, full property rights protection is a preferable regime.
It can then be shown that welfare increases in income faster under full
protection of property rights. Along with the above proposition this implies that there
exists a unique threshold level of income that leads to indifference between the two
regimes, y**: when present income is higher than the threshold (and only then) is the
regime of full protection of property rights superior to the regime of minimal protection.
Also note thaty** must be higher than the level of income which makes next-period
income equal under the two, y*. The reason for this is that consumption is lower under
full protection. Moreover, if  Lo is sufficiently small then y** > yO (becauseyo is
arbitrarily small)-see Figure 1.
We are now in a position to trace the intertemporal evolution of the economy. If
the initial income level is below y**, then minimal protection of property rights is
welfare superior. If the economy's growth rate is low in this case, then minimal
property rights protection will continue to dominate throughout the convergence  to the
steady state; specifically, if Lo is small enough, the steady-state  income level is small, yo
<y**, which implies that then switching to full property rights enforcement will never
take place. In contrast, if the initial income level is above y* *, then full protection of
property rights is selected, and the economy converges to a higher steady-state income
level, y'. Thus, the economy's evolution is history dependent and has multiple steady
states.
In contrast, if Lois moderate, then as can be seen from Figure 1, the economy
converges to the high steady state, independently of the initial conditions. This is the
case when even with a minimal protection of property rights growth is sufficient to
eventually enrich the economy,  so that full protection of property rights is subsequently
preferred.
Thus, we obtain
7Proposition 3. If  the initial level of  property rights enforcement is very low, the
economy's intertemporal evolution exhibits multiple equilibria depending on initial
income level: if it is low, the initially low level of  property rights enforcement persists,
and the economy converges to a low steady-state income level; if  it is high, the
economy eventually embraces the regime of full property rights protection and
converges to a high income steady state. If the initial level of property rights protection
is moderate, the economy adopts full property rights protection and converges to a high
income steady state, independently of the initial income level.
4.  Discussion
In this section, I first discuss some relevant empirical findings; then consider
two policy implications of the above results; and, finally, relate the paper to the existing
literature.
4.1  Empirical  Evidence
Quite a few empirical studies present empirical evidence that the quality of
governance has a robust effect on growth. Early contributions include Barro (1997),
Knack and Keefer (1997a, b), Mauro (1995), Svensson (1998). More recent and
detailed supportive evidence is provided in Chong and Calderon (2000), and in a
working paper Kaufmann and others (1999a).  In the last study, the authors find that a
one-standard deviation increase  in any of their governance indicators causes between a
two-and-a-half and four-fold increase in per capita incomes. There are several channels
through which this relationship can be manifested. Knack and Keefer (1997b), and
Mauro  (1995), for example, find that poorly protected property rights affect physical
investment. King and Levine (1993), Demirguc-Kunt and Maksimovic  (1998), among
others, present similar evidence with regard to investment in financial  assets.
Evidence on the reverse relationship, from income to corruption, can be gauged
using Kaufnann  and others (1999b), which provides an excellent dataset on the quality
of governance across more that 150 countries, exhibiting six measures of quality of
governance. My own calculations based on these data suggest that the partial
correlation between income per capita and the different measures of quality of
8government across these countries hover between 0.70-0.90,  and the correlation
between  income per capita and the rule-of-law  variable is in the upper range of this
interval.5 Treisman (2000), finds empirical support for the moderating effect of income
level on corruption in his more rigorous statistical analysis.
The data have been expanded and the methodology upgraded in Hall and Jones
(1999), Kaufmann and others (1999a),  and Chong and Calderon (2000). All three
studies recogrnize that different observable measures of quality of governance can be
construed only as proxies for the variable of interest, and all studies are aware of the
simultaneity of the relationship between these measures and growth.  Their econometric
analyses take care of these issues.
Hall and Jones (1999), is rooted in growth accounting and focuses on cross-
country differences in income per capita arising in a steady state.6 It employs subjective
evaluations of aspects of governance,  such as bureaucratic efficiency,  corruption,  _
maintenance of law and order, supplemented by the degree of openness to international
trade.7 The authors use various geographic and linguistic measures of the effect of the
Western culture as instruments. Using cross-sectional  evidence for 127 countries, the
paper presents robust findings on the positive effects of good governance on growth,
which significantly supplements the effect of physical and capital accumulation.  The
authors argue that the extent to which a country was exposed to Western influence has
played a crucial role in its ability to design proper institutions for good governance.
Kaufinann and others (1999a), is similar in many respects. It uses an enlarged dataset
and constructs a much wider battery of measures of governance quality based on a
variety of (subjective) sources, incidentally dismissing the trade openness variable. This
study's conclusions  reinforce by and large Hall and Jones' (1999), results.  Although the
findings in both these studies are generally in line with this paper's theory, the work of
Chong and Calderon (2000), can be viewed  as providing the most direct supportive
5  All linear regressions of income per capita on the measures of government quality yield highly
significant results.
6 The authors refer to their approach  as "level accounting".
7These evaluations  are provided by a private consulting  firm, Political Risk Services, which
specializes  in providing assessments of countries' political risks. The measures of governance  used by
different researchers  are typically based on such subjective judgments.
9evidence.  There, the authors explicitly test for the mutual causality between good
governance  and growth, suggesting "multiple institutional  equilibria", whereby good
institutions promote growth, which then leads to the adoption of good institutions. They
conclude that causality runs in both directions thus providing tentative support for the
theoretical claim made above.
4.2  Policy Implications
In contrast to the previously made assumption, suppose that the government
cannot precommit itself to the rule of law. In other words, while the extent of  property
rights protection is determined before the individuals actually engage in rent seeking,
suppose that their investment choices have already been made. Thus, first come the
investment decisions; then the choice of  rule-of-law,  then time allocation. Since
investment-being now inelastic-is  not affected by the enforcement decision, full
enforcement is now less advantageous.  Thus, the government has an ex post incentive
to renege on its obligation of full enforcement.  But correctly anticipating such a breach
of commitment and the resulting intensive rent-seeking effort, the individuals will tend
underinvest. This stresses the importance of a firn  commitment to enforcement rules
that in principle could be achieved by other means such as a constitutional commitment,
an independent judiciary etc.
The above results rest on the (quite reasonable)  assumption that the world's
capital market is imperfect, so that a poor country cannot borrow resources to finance a
better enforcement of property rights. This indicates the importance of credit
availability in order to implement the necessary reform of the judiciary and law
enforcement agencies.  Such credit can only be provided by international lending
institutions. Thus, our analysis suggests an important role for such institutions implying
particular ways of framing conditionality requirements  on their loans. Indeed, the
World Bank's loans for legal and judicial reforrn efforts worldwide are currently worth
over $380 million.8
8  See the transcript of the speech by the President of the World Bank on July 9, 2001, in St.-
Petersburg,  Russia, press release 2002/013/S, available on website http://econ.worldbank.org/
104.3  Literature
This paper draws on the seminal contributions of  North (1990), and Olson
(1996), which stress the role of institutions for economic development and some of its
results are also related to Olson's (1982), on interest groups as an impediment to
growth. Both authors acknowledge the importance of the double feedback relationship
between institutions and economic performance  in their informal analyses, which is the
point made in this paper as well.
While the motivation for this paper is provided by the recent empirical evidence
briefly summarized above, the specifics of the presented model are related to two
braches of the literature and, in a sense, builds on their insights. One building block is
the literature on economic consequences of appropriative activities. Important papers in
this literature  include Skaperdas (1992) and Grossman and Kim (1995), who have
focused on endogenous determiination of property rights. In particular, the latter paper
studies the emergence of  property rights as an equilibrium of aggressive and defensive
individual investments.  The shared component between the present paper and this work
is the endogeneity of property rights enforcement.
That earlier literature has not been explicitly interested, however, in growth
implications of property right enforcement. More recent literature, exemplified by Lane
and Tomell (1996), and Tomell (1997,  1999) studies the effects of imperfectly
protected property rights on growth. It typically views the economy as consisting of
rival interest groups competing over a common pool of resources.  In a somewhat
related vein, Ehrlich and Lui (1999),  also study the relationship between the quality of
government ("corruption')  and growth. Likewise, Zak (2002), is also concerned with
economic growth in the shadow of appropriation threats. In an earlier paper, Gradstein
(2002), I have shown that commitment to redistributional rules results in faster growth
than discretionary redistribution,  and this effect is stronger in an unstable economy. All
this work does not consider,  however, the endogenous determination of the level of
protection itself, which is an essential feature of this paper.
115.  Concluding Remarks
This paper formalizes the self-enforcing relationship between the enforcement
of property rights and economic growth, first introduced in North (1990), and Olson
(1982,  1996). A crucial aspect of the model is that law enforcement,  while leading to a
better protection of  property rights (and, therefore,  is growth-promoting)  is costly and
requires resources which only exist in sufficiently affluent economies.  Thus, the
analysis identifies two steady states: one with only minimal protection of  property
rights and low income, and the other with full protection of property rights and high
income. The recent empirical findings are interpreted as being broadly supportive of
this theory.
Our view of law enforcement  as a public good, which the government is
expected to provide under a contractual commitment, differs from some of the recent
literature on appropriation with a more sinister attitude. A very interesting work such as
Konrad and Skaperdas (1999),  and Moselle and Polak (2001), exhibits a more
suspicious attitude towards the state, arguing that it could be damaging even if the
alternative is the relative absence of law enforcement.  Consideration of the implications
of this contrasting approach  for economic  growth could constitute a worthwhile
extension of the paper.
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